

Aug. 21, 2001

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1. Introduction

Panic in Florida, 2000

- Manual counting vs. Electronic counting
- Booth voting vs. Network voting
- Local verifiability vs. Universal verifiability


Why do we consider Internet voting?

- Anyone: can vote using internet
- Anywhere: from home, office, overseas, etc.
- -> Solution for the problem of decreasing the participation rate in manual voting

What are the problems in Internet voting?

- Strong security requirements: anonymity, privacy, completeness, fairness, receipt-freeness, etc.
- No perfect solution and system
- PKI is not ready







New Trial

California

 Shadow election test of Internet voting system for the public election in Conta Costa County in 2000.

Caltech-MIT

- Joint project started in 2000 to develop reliable and uniform US voting machine
- To solve the problems that threatened the 2000 American presidential election in Florida

Cybervote

- Remote Internet voting with mobile handset
- European Communities

Our contribution

- Internet voting system using PKI
- The system satisfies most of important security requirements





2. Security Requirements

Basic requirements

- Privacy : All votes must be secret
- Completeness : All valid votes are counted correctly
- Soundness : The dishonest voter cannot disrupt the voting
- Unreusability : No voter can vote twice
- Eligibility : No one who isn't allowed to vote can vote
- Fairness : Nothing can affect the voting

Advanced requirements

- Walk-away : The voter need not to make any action after voting
- Robustness : The voting system should be successful regardless of partial failure of the system
- Universal verifiability : Anyone can verify the validity of vote
- Receipt-freeness : Voter should not be able to prove his or her vote to a buyer. (Voter does not have any receipt for the vote)





3. Voting Scheme

FOO92 Scheme

- Fujioka, Okamoto, Ohta, "A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections", Auscrypt'92
- Features: Blind signature + Mix-net + Bit commitment

Implementation examples

- Sensus : L.F. Cranor, Washington Univ. http://www.ccrc.wustl.edu/~lorracks/sensus
- EVOX : M.A. Herschberg, R.L. Rivest, MIT <u>http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~cis/voting/voting.html</u>

OMAFO99 Scheme


- Improved version of FOO92
- Features : Blind signature + Mix-net + threshold encryption





OMAFO99 scheme


System overview








4. System Configuration






Registration stage







Voting Stage







Counting Stage Admin Mix Server Web Server 4) Announce 1) Mixing **BB Server** 3) Results Publish DB **BB DB** 2) Tallying Counters Threshold 11 Crypto2001



(IRIS



5. Typical Implementation

Built-in components

- Java crypto library J/LOCK by STI
- CA server by KSIGN
- Web interface by InsolSoft
- Security management by SECUi.com

Severs

- AS,BB : Apache web server and Tomcat to support JSP
- DB : Oracle DB + JDBC
- M,T : Implemented in C language

Voting applet

- Signed java applet to access a secret key and to open connections to multiple addresses
- Platform : WINDOW98 /+ on IBM PC



6. Target

2002 FIFA World Cup Korea-Japan[™]

• May. 31. ~ June. 30. 2002

Objective



- Selection of MVP player in 2002 world-cup games
- Demonstrating electronic voting system to the world in easy and friendly manner

Participants

- Korea : IRIS, InsolSoft, KISTI, Samsung Secui.com, STI
- Japan : NTT, Univ. of Tokyo

Web-page

http://mvp.worldcup2002.or.kr







Example

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7. Summary

Experimental Design of Internet voting system

- User friendly and secure Internet voting system
- Applying PKI to the voting system

Expected Results

- cyber MVPs of 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea-Japan[™]
- Contribution to the development of information security relatedindustry such as PKI.
- Valuable lessons to the planned Internet voting systems such as Cybervote in EC.

Help

- No hacking from crypto society.
- Any comments are welcome.
- Social engineering, political problem, etc



